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Abstract
Background: Food tax-subsidy policies are proposed to hold promise for helping to produce healthier patterns
of food purchasing and consumption at population level. Evidence for their effects derives largely from simulation
studies that explore the potential effects of untried policies using a mathematical modelling framework. This paper
provides a critique first of the nature of the evidence derived from such simulation studies, and second of the
challenges of cumulating that evidence to inform public health policy.
Discussion: Effects estimated by simulation studies of food taxes and subsidies can be expected to diverge in
potentially important ways from those that would accrue in practice because these models are simplified, typically
static, representations of complex adaptive systems. The level of confidence that can be placed in modelled
estimates of effects is correspondingly low, and the level of associated uncertainty is high. Moreover, evidence
from food tax-subsidy simulation studies cannot meaningfully be cumulated using currently available quantitative
evidence synthesis methods, to reduce uncertainty about effects.
Summary: Simulation studies are critical for the initial phases of an incremental research process, for drawing
together diverse evidence and exploring potential longer-term effects. While simulation studies of food taxes and
subsidies provide a valuable and necessary input to the formulation of public health policy in this area, they are
unlikely to be sufficient, and policy makers should not place excessive reliance on evidence from such studies, either
singly or cumulatively. To reflect known and unknown limitations of the models, results of such studies should be
interpreted cautiously as tentative projections. Modelling studies should increasingly be integrated with more
empirical studies of the effects of food tax and subsidy policies in practice.
Keywords: Food, Taxes, Subsidies, Public health, Policy, Mathematical model, Evidence synthesis,
Meta-analysis as topic
Background
Taxes and subsidies imposed on foods, beverages or their
component nutrients are proposed to improve health
through a simple causal pathway [1-5]. First, they might
induce changes in the relative prices of less healthy foods
and drinks compared with healthier alternatives. Second,
these price changes might incentivise enough people to
purchase and consume an overall healthier diet, leading to
meaningful reductions in the prevalence of risk factors for
non-communicable diseases. Despite considerable uncer-
tainty surrounding both of these propositions, this logic
forms the basis of the argument for calls to governments
to introduce food taxes and subsidies – especially taxes on
sugar-sweetened beverages – as part of broader public
health strategies to improve people’s diets [1-5].
Evidence for the effects of food taxes and subsidies on
diet-related outcomes derives largely from studies that
simulate the potential effects of hypothetical policies using
mathematical models (simulation studies). Based on a sys-
tematic scoping review [6] and additional targeted searches,
there are at least 35 published studies that simulate such ef-
fects in High Income Countries [7-41].
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There is also direct evidence from a small set of studies
that exploit variation between US states in rates of sales
taxes imposed on sweetened drinks or snack foods to
evaluate their impacts on purchasing, consumption, energy
intake or obesity [42-47]. The small effect sizes reported by
these studies have been attributed to the low tax rates in-
volved, which vary up to a maximum of around 7%
[4,42-47]. These are rare examples of studies that have eval-
uated food tax-subsidy policies implemented by national,
state, or other legislatures in terms of dietary health-related
outcomes [4,48]. That such studies are rare is likely to re-
flect various issues including a lack of policies to evaluate,
the short time over which such policies have been sus-
tained, their introduction for reasons other than public
health, and a lack of good quality data with which to make
suitable comparisons [48].
A third category of study involves experiments conducted
in closed laboratory or simulated environments to investi-
gate consumer responses to experimental manipulations of
the relative prices of different foods [4,49]. A narrative re-
view of these studies concluded that, whilst price changes
can modify purchases of targeted foods, evidence for im-
pacts on the overall nutritional quality of purchases is
equivocal [49].
The weight of evidence in this area therefore rests
overwhelmingly upon simulation studies. In this article
we discuss challenges in the production, synthesis and
interpretation of evidence from simulation studies of
food taxes and subsidies to inform policy, based on a
critical examination of such studies. We argue that the
crudeness of food tax-subsidy policies, together with the
complexity required in the modelling, renders much of
this evidence ambiguous at best, and potentially mis-
leading at worst. Whilst acknowledging the relevance of
evidence from other forms of study to the policy debate,
we argue that the priority should be to conduct more
targeted outcome evaluations of the effects of imple-
mented policies.
Discussion
Food tax-subsidy models
Simulation models have an established role as aids to deci-
sion making in the initial phases of policy appraisal, to ex-
plore untried policy options with uncertain outcomes
[50-52]. Such models are intended to represent the essential
structure of causal pathways between a policy intervention
and changes in outcomes. By definition, all models simplify
reality. The degree of simplification is partly a matter of
judgement, but is also constrained by the availability of data
to inform model conceptualisationa and specificationb and
to assign values to input parameters – the measurable,
quantifiable characteristics incorporated in a model [53-55].
Whilst modelling approaches vary, food-tax subsidy
models are typically structured to reflect the simple causal
pathway described in the opening paragraph. Food de-
mand systems are estimated in which the tax, subsidy or
combined tax-subsidy policy scenario under consideration
determines price changes in targeted (taxed or subsidised)
foods. The tax or subsidy may be levied directly on one or
more specific food categories (for example, a change in
the rate of value-added-tax levied on fruits and vegetables
[36], or a change in the sales tax levied on sugar-
sweetened beverages [14]), or alternatively on the nutri-
ents contained in foods (for example, a subsidy per gram
of fibre [36], or a tax per gram of sugar in sugar-
sweetened beverages [9]). The foods and nutrients to
which taxes and subsidies have been applied in simulation
studies invariably appear to be appropriate targets for
intervention from a public health perspective. Estimated
or assumed price changes in taxed or subsidised foods in
turn determine changes in quantities purchased of a set of
food products. The sizes of these changes are regulated by
own-price elasticities (the estimated change in quantity
purchased if the price of that good itself changes), often
by cross-price elasticities (the estimated change in quan-
tity purchased if the price of another good changes), and
by baseline levels of purchasing. These model input pa-
rameters are typically estimated by analysis of retrospect-
ive large-scale survey data [56-59]. While the set of food
products included in these food demand systems is typic-
ally wider than those directly targeted by the policy in
question, it is still often limited compared with the vast
array of foods available in practice. Two examples drawn
from each end of this continuum are the food demand
system estimated by Kuchler and colleagues, which was
limited to own- and cross-price elasticities among four
categories of salty snacks [24], and the food demand sys-
tem estimated by Smed and colleagues, which encom-
passed own- and cross-price elasticities within and among
23 food groups [36]. Few studies estimate the effects
beyond food, however, although in theory this is an
important consideration because changes in price could
influence overall consumption, and saving, decisions of
households. Many models are configured to simulate
subsequent changes in quantities of foods consumed
(typically assuming a 1:1 or other constant ratio of
consumption to purchasing) and corollary changes in
energy and nutrient intake. Some extrapolate further still
to estimate changes in body weight or body mass index
and corollary changes in the prevalence of overweight and
obesity [e.g. 12,14,17,37].
Many of the simplifying assumptions incorporated into
food tax-subsidy models are reasonable and supported by
empirical evidence (for example, the basic assumption that
changes in the relative prices of various foods will influence
quantities of those foods purchased), or are likely to have
negligible influence on estimates of effects (for example,
that foods can meaningfully be grouped into categories
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such as sugar-sweetened beverages, rather than being
treated as discrete products such as cola, lemonade and
ginger beer). Others could be tested in future studies as
published data become available from jurisdictions that
have already introduced (and in some cases, subsequently
rescinded) relevant policies, such as France, Denmark and
Mexico. One example is the ‘pass-through rate’ — a meas-
ure of the extent to which a tax or subsidy is passed
through to consumers in the form of increased or de-
creased prices at the checkout. Modellers typically assume
this parameter (rate) to be 100%, but uncertainty remains
about the influence of potential supply-side responses.
These include product reformulation to avoid taxes on spe-
cific nutrients or otherwise reduce product cost, the use of
countervailing marketing campaigns, or the use of price
promotion strategies (e.g. loss leaders or multi-buy deals) to
limit (or amplify) the pass-through rate or to mask (or ex-
pose) its visibility or salience to consumers [6,58]. Input pa-
rameters in food tax-subsidy models are typically described
by unique values, and the impact of uncertainty about par-
ameter values on uncertainty in results is therefore not typ-
ically addressed. In our view, this is one of the major
limitations of such studies that is exemplified in the case of
the ‘pass-through rate’ parameter. The routine use of prob-
abilistic sensitivity analyses in these simulation models
would not only enable modelling of uncertainty in the pass-
through rate to incorporate this uncertainty in the final
model outputs (estimates of effects), it would also facilitate
examination of the influence of a change in the pass-
through rate on these outputs. This would explicitly iden-
tify which parameter uncertainty is driving the most uncer-
tainty in model outputs, and these parameters could be
prioritised for data collection in future evaluation studies of
implemented policies.
A critical weakness in current models is that they are
typically static rather than dynamic; they do not incorp-
orate factors such as feedback loops or damping. Feed-
back loops reflect situations in which initial changes in
behaviour may create the conditions for behaviour to
change further [60]. For example, public awareness that
a product has been taxed because it is unhealthy may
further discourage purchasing of that product over and
above any effect of the tax-induced increase in its rela-
tive price. Damping refers to the capacity of systems to
absorb and accommodate change, with the potential to
attenuate the effects of policy interventions when these
interact with multiple, simultaneously occurring pro-
cesses [61]. For example, further deregulation of the
European Union sugar market in 2017 is expected to
further reduce the reference price of sugar in Europe
[62]. In the case of taxes that add a percentage to the
prices of the taxed product(s), this has the potential to
absorb, to some extent, tax-induced increases in the
relative prices of foods with added sugars, and therefore
moderate any initial effects of a tax on purchasing. The
scope for researchers to model these kinds of systems
dynamic factors is limited by the lack of relevant evi-
dence to inform corresponding parameter values. How-
ever, lack of data should not be sufficient for ignoring
conceptually relevant parameters, and deeper uncertain-
ties of this kind that are not quantifiable can still be ac-
knowledged as inadequacies of the models (things we
know we have left out or been unable to model prop-
erly), alongside unacknowledged inadequacies (things we
have not even thought of ) [63].
These observations invite a view of simulation studies
of food taxes and subsides as preliminary forays in an in-
cremental, phased research process, intermediate in kind
between analytic theory and empirical testing [51,53].
From this perspective, effects estimated by simulation
studies can be expected to diverge in potentially import-
ant ways from those that would accrue in practice.
Cumulating evidence from food tax-subsidy models
Combining the results of multiple studies, assembled using
explicit, systematic methods, can provide more reliable as-
sessments of potential intervention effects than single stud-
ies alone [64]. This claim is grounded in notions of science
as a cumulative process [65], in which the results of each
new study can be integrated with those of existing, compar-
able studies in an updated, aggregating synthesis, to reduce
residual uncertainty about the effects of policy interventions
[66,67]. In this section we consider the feasibility of apply-
ing three commonly applied aggregative evidence synthesis
strategies to cumulate the results of simulation studies of
the effects of food tax-subsidy policies: narrative synthesis,
statistical meta-analysis and vote-counting. This frames a
discussion of whether the results of such studies can mean-
ingfully be cumulated to reduce uncertainty about interven-
tion effects.
Narrative synthesis
Published reviews that incorporate evidence from simu-
lation models and other studies (‘see Background’) of the
effects of food taxes and subsidies have drawn conclu-
sions broadly in support of their introduction [68-73].
Analyses in these reviews have almost exclusively been
limited to narrative synthesis, a textual approach to ag-
gregating evidence from included studies to ‘tell the
overall story’ of their findings [74]. Narrative syntheses
may be susceptible to conscious or unconscious re-
searcher bias when those telling the story advocate or
oppose the policies for which evidence is being synthe-
sised [75-77]. They are also held to be more challenging
for larger bodies of evidence [78] and those charac-
terised by a multiplicity of effects that need to be traded
off against one another in processing the evidence —
both features of the case in point.
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Meta-analysis
Statistical meta-analysis has been developed and become
established in many fields of the health and social sciences.
It aims to reduce statistical imprecision and represent un-
certainty in estimates of effects by using quantitative tech-
niques to aggregate estimates collected from multiple
studies [79]. This involves calculating a weighted average
summary effect-size for each outcome along with associ-
ated confidence intervals [80]. Procedures for computing
study-level effect sizes for continuous outcome variables (e.
g. standardised mean differences for measures of food pur-
chasing, consumption or body weight) and inverse variance
weights require estimates of mean values of outcomes, as-
sociated standard deviations (standard errors for inverse
variance weights) and sample sizes [80]. As noted above,
most models employed in simulation studies of food taxes
and subsidies are deterministic and do not therefore in-
clude measures of uncertainty from which standard devia-
tions could be computed. In addition, simulation studies do
not have sample sizes, and these cannot typically be in-
ferred due to the same lack of measures of uncertainty.
These factors preclude the use of current methods of meta-
analysis to synthesise the results of simulation studies of
food taxes and subsidies, which explains the lack of pub-
lished meta-analyses of such studies.
In one systematic review, Eyles and colleagues did, how-
ever, derive ‘quantitatively pooled’ estimates of the sizes of
modelled effects. This involved calculating descriptive
statistics (means and ranges) for own-price elasticities of
targeted foods and outcomes, if these had been estimated
in three or more included studies targeting the same type
of food or nutrient [68]. In practice Eyles and colleagues
were able to do this for own-price elasticities (model in-
puts) of three target products and only two outcome mea-
sures. Based primarily on these results, they concluded
that “…taxes on carbonated drinks and saturated fat, and
subsidies on fruits and vegetables would be associated
with beneficial dietary change, with the potential for im-
proved health.” [68]. However, whilst they also reported
“substantial variability in outcomes assessed across stud-
ies”, the authors did not explicitly reveal the overall large
number of outcomes assessed within and across included
studies (but just not in three or more studies). In our view,
generalizing to ‘beneficial dietary change’ from summary
estimates of a handful of outcomes, whilst disregarding
hundreds of other outcomes assessed among included
studies, may reflect a logical fallacy that is conceptually
similar to the selective emphasis that may be placed on
some findings over others in a narrative synthesis [76,77].
Vote counting
A third candidate quantitative synthesis technique we con-
sidered that might be applied to this problem was vote-
counting analysis using a hypothesis-testing framework
[78]. For each specific outcome, the number of scenarios
across simulation studies in which a tax (or subsidy) has
been estimated to increase the value of a given outcome
would be compared with the number in which a tax (or
subsidy) has been estimated to decrease its value. A sign
test – a non-parametric statistical test – would then be
used to test whether these numbers were different from
those expected if the null hypothesis of no effect were true.
This basic approach is limited to investigating the presence
and direction, but (crucially) not the size, of a potential ef-
fect. However, because few specific outcomes have been
assessed in multiple simulation studies of food-tax subsidy
policies, this would typically have insufficient statistical
power to reject the null hypothesis of no difference, lead-
ing to the likelihood of false negative results. Alternatively,
if we aggregated specific outcomes by the broad construct
they capture (e.g. purchasing outcomes for which an in-
crease in value would represent an adverse impact on diet-
ary intake) and applied the same analytic approach, this
analysis would be fatally flawed precisely because it inves-
tigates the direction but not size of effects. This factor
may explain the lack of published syntheses that have uti-
lised this type of analysis.
Consider an illustrative example in which an aggregated
set of purchasing outcomes comprises measures of levels of
purchasing of (i) sugar, (ii) saturated fats, and (iii) salt. If an
individual simulation estimated the potential effects of a
food tax on these three specific outcomes as being a large
decrease in purchasing of sugar alongside negligible
increases in purchasing of both saturated fats and salt, we
might reasonably judge that the net balance of potential
effects on dietary intake would likely be desirable. More-
over, if twenty studies (using different datasets and variant,
reasonable assumptions) were to produce the same pattern
of results, then we might reasonably expect this to confer
greater confidence in our judgement. However, an
aggregate-level vote counting analysis would score this
combination of results as 40–20 in favour of undesirable
versus desirable effects, with the result of the sign test indi-
cating an undesirable effect on purchasing outcomes. The
key implication is that, because vote-counting analyses
consider only the direction and not the magnitude of
effects, it is not possible to interpret the results of an
aggregate-level vote counting analysis as having any bearing
on the public health case for or against the introduction of
food taxes and subsidies.
Even if a vote counting analysis were preceded by the use
of expert judgement to assess whether the overall health
impact of a pattern of changes in multiple outcomes is
likely to be beneficial or harmful, it may be beyond the cog-
nitive capacity of even the most diligent expert to assimilate
and trade off such information in a consistent manner. For
example, Table 1 shows modelled estimates of the potential
effects of a simultaneous 10% increase in the prices of all
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foods within three high-fat product categories on purchas-
ing of 32 nutrients, extracted from a single simulation study
[8]. The results represent a mixed bag of desirable (e.g.
reduction in sugar purchasing or increase in Vitamin E
purchasing) and undesirable (e.g. increase in alcohol pur-
chasing or decrease in fibre purchasing) potential effects,
with proportionate changes from baseline levels ranging
from −5.4% to +2.4% and a degree of variation between
‘modest’ and ‘well-off ’ households.
Summary
Evidence for the effects of food taxes and subsidies de-
rives largely from simulation studies that investigate the
potential effects of untried policies using a mathematical
modelling framework. In discussing this evidence base,
we have highlighted that effects estimated in this way
can be expected to diverge in potentially important ways
from those that would accrue in practice. This calls for a
basic humility in communicating model results, with
clear and consistent acknowledgement that modelled es-
timates of effects are tentative projections, entirely con-
ditional on incorporated assumptions and data.
We have also set out reasons why results of published
simulation studies of food taxes and subsidies cannot
meaningfully be cumulated using currently available
methods of quantitative synthesis. If these studies are it-
erative and not cumulative, this implies their contribu-
tion is that of providing a series of discrete, exploratory
estimates of the potential effects of specific policy scenar-
ios. We acknowledge, however, that other forms of synthe-
ses of studies of food taxes and subsidies might usefully
contribute to debate concerning the feasibility, implemen-
tation and evaluation of such policies [58,66,81].
Policy makers should therefore not place excessive re-
liance on evidence from simulation studies of food taxes
and subsidies, either singly or cumulatively, in formulat-
ing public health policy. Rather, they should be seen as a
guide and complement to the development and inter-
pretation of empirical studies of policy options, inform-
ing the design of the most robust quasi-experimental
studies possible to evaluate actual changes in relative
unit retail prices and patterns of food purchasing and
consumption, and to allow more accurate estimation of
corollary impacts on health-related outcomes [48,82].
Importantly, the data derived from these studies can be
used to substantially increase the precision of models to
assist in assessing likely generalizability and longer-term
effects more robustly than at present, especially in the
link between more immediate behavioural endpoints (for
example, food, energy or nutrient purchasing) and final
health outcomes (principally, mortality and morbidity
associated with NCDs) that may be less amenable to dir-
ect observation in intervention studies. With the ultim-
ate goal to improve population health, the study of food
taxes and subsidies will require modelling to allow inte-
gration of evidence from both intervention studies and
epidemiological studies, and extrapolation beyond what
can be measured from intermediate to final health out-
comes [82]. However, these models will only be as good
as the data they are based upon. They are therefore not
a substitute for well conducted empirical studies, but
Table 1 Predicted effects of a ‘fat tax’-induced 10% price
increases in (i) cheese, butter and cream, (ii) prepared
meals, and (iii) sugar-fat products* on quantities of
nutrients purchased over a four-week period
Predicted effect
Modest households Well-off households
Nutrient Direction Size (%) Direction Size (%)
Energy ↓ −3.6 ↓ −3.4
Protein ↓ −3.0 ↓ −2.9
Vegetable protein ↓ −5.4 ↓ −5.4
Animal protein ↓ −2.3 ↓ −2.1
Carbohydrate ↓ −5.1 ↓ −5.0
Sugar ↓ −3.7 ↓ −3.2
Starch ↓ −6.7 ↓ −7.6
Fat ↓ −3.2 ↓ −3.1
Saturated fat ↓ −4.5 ↓ −4.3
Monounsaturated fat ↓ −3.3 ↓ −3.2
Polyunsaturated fat ↑ +0.2 ↑ +0.5
Cholesterol ↓ −4.7 ↓ −4.5
Alcohol ↑ +2.4 ↑ +1.3
Fibres ↓ −3.7 ↓ −3.2
Retinol ↓ −2.6 ↓ −2.4
Beta-carotene ↑ +0.9 ↑ +0.7
Vitamin B1 ↓ −4.3 ↓ −4.3
Vitamin B2 ↓ −3.1 ↓ −3.0
Vitamin B3 ↓ −2.2 ↓ −2.1
Vitamin B5 ↓ −2.9 ↓ −2.7
Vitamin B6 ↓ −3.0 ↓ −2.8
Vitamin B9 ↓ −2.7 ↓ −2.3
Vitamin B12 ↓ −0.8 ↓ −0.5
Vitamin C ↓ −1.0 ↓ −0.8
Vitamin D ↓ −1.6 ↓ −1.0
Vitamin E ↑ +1.2 ↑ +1.7
Iron ↓ −3.3 ↓ −3.2
Calcium ↓ −3.2 ↓ −2.9
Magnesium ↓ −3.3 ↓ −2.9
Sodium ↓ −5.3 ↓ −5.4
Phosphorus ↓ −3.4 ↓ −3.2
Potassium ↓ −2.2 ↓ −1.9
Source: Adapted from Allais 2010 [8]. *Candy, chocolate, cookies, pastry,
ice cream, jam etc.
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rather a necessary, albeit not sufficient, component in
establishing the evidence for policy in this area. Food tax,
subsidy and/or combined tax-subsidy policies will also need
to be designed and implemented in close alignment with
evaluation planning, reserving the options to reformulate
or rescind policies should they fail to achieve desired
outcomes (and avoid undesired outcomes) in practice.
Endnotes
aModel conceptualisation is the process of developing
an understanding of the real-world causal pathway being
modelled and of the potential moderating influences of
variant characteristics of the policy itself, the systems in
which the policy is implemented, and interactions be-
tween the policy and host systems, on outcomes.
bModel specification is the process of translating the
conceptual model into a mathematical framework.
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